I've come across a transcript of a daily press briefing by James P. Rubin, in Washington DC, October 13, 1998.
Excerpt from the Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, October 13, 1998
QUESTION: Four days sounds like a deadline. Is there now a deadline for Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: Let me put it this way--as the President said earlier, the facts are going to speak for themselves. If President Milosevic makes clear that he will engage seriously and substantially comply with the requirements of the international community, then NATO will be in a position to further suspend the decision to launch air strikes. If, on the other hand, President Milosevic doesn't take substantial steps towards compliance, then the order will remain in General Clark's hands and he will be in a position to launch air strikes.
QUESTION: I understand that, but on the plane, there were a lot of numbers and the numbers suggested that he had a long, long way to go to meet UN requirements. So you remove 10% of the police maybe; only a fraction of his troops have been withdrawn. I'm having a problem with four days and moving out tens of thousands of people who have a great facility for killing civilians. How are you going to measure--I mean, if he moves back another 1,000 policemen, is he out from under again for a few months?
MR. RUBIN: Barry, this is not a science; this requires judgment. And we're going to bring to bear the best judgment that we have. The judgment is going to be based on our assessment of what Milosevic has done and the beginnings of a verification system so that we can know with greater confidence--that is, an on-site verification system where people can monitor this.
As Mr. Berger said earlier this morning, what we're looking for is substantial, serious progress by Friday night, Saturday morning, which is the time when the 96 hours run out. If we have substantial and serious compliance, then the NATO authorities would be in a position to further suspend the authority to use force.
With respect to numbers, let me just say that the numbers game is fairly tricky because you have to take into account what was there, what will go into garrison and what wasn't there prior to the crisis beginning. Our standard is essentially a February-March time period, before the police forces and the Yugoslav National Army forces went in and engaged in this brutal crackdown on the Kosovar Albanians.
So we will be judging President Milosevic by the specific requirements of the UN Security Council resolution, including pulling back those forces responsible for the crackdown, and putting those that were there in garrison. I'm not going to get into a position where I say every last troop has to be in the right place by Friday night; I'm saying that there has to be substantial and credible compliance. We will know it when we see it.
QUESTION: How about the dug-in troops? In a sense, I'm just playing back to the Administration the tough line the Administration took at one point. I'm just trying to figure out because I'm not with Holbrooke--you had six or seven demands--it kept changing. I know you had a big breakthrough on verification. Did you get anything on war criminals? You wanted all the special police out; you wanted all the troops out; we asked specifically if going to garrison was good enough. You said no and you were extremely--I don't mean you specifically--
MR. RUBIN: There are so many questions I don't even know how to begin to address them.
QUESTION: No, you know where I'm going on this. MR. RUBIN: Try to ask a specific question and then I'll try to answer.
QUESTION: All right. How about the troops dug in--those winterizing troops who are specifically on highways to torment and terrorize civilians and make it impossible for them to get back? I know you've got verification now; that's a breakthrough. But you now don't have to have all the troops in--he just has to make a good faith effort?
MR. RUBIN: Please ask a specific question, and I'll be happy to answer it.
QUESTION: The specific question is, what happened to your hard-line proposition? How many of them have been modified in order to reach some sort of a compromise agreement?
MR. RUBIN: Nothing has been modified; the same line applies, Barry. I don't know why you're making up previous statements.
QUESTION: Well, you said go to the garrison. I didn't make it up. You wanted all the troops out of the country.
MR. RUBIN: Nobody said that.
QUESTION: I'll try to rephrase it in a different way.
MR. RUBIN: Then maybe I can answer it.
QUESTION: Substantial compliance sounds like a softening from the position a few days ago. Can you address that?
MR. RUBIN: Yes. We're talking about the next four days--actually, now three-and-a-half days. We're talking about making the threat of force continue to hang over the head of President Milosevic so that we get as much compliance as we can in the next four days. There are a whole series of requirements that have stayed the same, because every time we've been asked what the requirements are, we've referred to Resolution 1199 of the UN Security Council. There's only one such resolution; so the requirements are quite clear (as to) what President Milosevic has to do.
With respect to whether force will be used, that will be judged based on the compliance that we see in the coming days. And then--and this is even more important--assuming that we have substantial and serious compliance in the coming days--we are going to try to ensure that the credibility of the threat of force that now exists, with NATO having made this decision and the authority resting in General Wes Clark's hands, will remain throughout this crisis. So that NATO's ability to enforce compliance and compel compliance will remain with the inherent threat of force that will continue throughout.
I am not saying--and I think nobody is saying, and nobody who has any realistic assessment of what can go on the ground is saying--that every single thing is going to be done in the next 24 hours. That is simply a fantasy land. What we're looking for is a demonstrated, serious effort on the part of the Serb authorities to engage in wholesale compliance with the requirements of the international community. That means letting monitors in, verifiers in; allowing the verification mission to begin to set up in Pristina; moving forward to set up an interim arrangement by early November. There are a whole series of activities that we need to push forward in the coming days; all the time with President Milosevic knowing that the threat of force hangs over his head.
QUESTION: The war crimes part of this has sort of been thrown in the last few days. How does that play out?
MR. RUBIN: That is part of 1199, and we expect full compliance; that's part of 1199.
QUESTION: So there's never been any talk of bombing Milosevic if he doesn't comply with that.
MR. RUBIN: That analogy doesn't hold, because NATO didn't envisage bombing for every violation of the Dayton accords.
QUESTION: So what you want Milosevic to do, then, is go along with this extradition treaty or this extradition vehicle that you all have been pushing for the last three years--
MR. RUBIN: We want him to cooperate with the Security Council organization set up for this purpose, which is the War Crimes Tribunal. That will require him to allow people to come in and investigate. Whether or not he will ever accept the so-called legal jurisdiction of the Tribunal is something we expect to continue to discuss. But we want the investigators to get in there and get the cooperation they need to do their job.
QUESTION: This would be for crimes in Kosovo in the past--not going back to the Bosnian War?
MR. RUBIN: Correct. Resolution 1199 is referencing Kosovo, correct.
QUESTION: Jamie, are you not encouraging, though, the return of NGOs and humanitarian aid people and everybody else back into Kosovo; is that not correct?
MR. RUBIN: Well, we haven't made any--let me speak for ourselves, and then we'll talk about the other organs. For ourselves, I think several--maybe four or five-- embassy personnel returned or will shortly return to Belgrade today.
We are reviewing carefully and examining the security situation with respect to the other embassy personnel who were ordered to depart. We would expect for some time to leave the dependents who were authorized to depart a week before in a position to stay away until the situation settles down.
We do think that there is a move towards compliance; and that is why President Clinton made the statement he made last night, and that is why he made it this morning. We do believe that by allowing this verification mission in and making clear that it can come in, and by us putting together a very complicated verification team of on-site verifiers, that we are going to be in a position to verify compliance across the board. Then we will know all the answers to the perfectly legitimate questions related to Serbian compliance with 1199.
In the meantime, we do expect the monitors to be going back in a day or so, and then in some days after that, the beginnings of the verification mission to be organized and begin its work--with, obviously, more time required to get up to speed and be able to go to 2,000 or so verifiers that the mission envisages.
QUESTION: My question concerns the relief workers.
MR. RUBIN: Well, one of the requirements of Resolution 1199 is that the Serbian authorities stop denying cooperation with the relief workers. That means stop maintaining an embargo on commercial supplies of various wheat. It means allowing those who are there to have the necessary visa arrangements to not be blocked at roadblocks, and all of that.
As I understand that situation, there has been recently a fairly good freedom of movement on the roads in the last few days. With respect to the organizations themselves that are NGOs, what we can do is tell them what we're doing, and they can get information from the monitors as to how the roads are and how the cooperation will be; and they will make their own judgments. But if the situation is not improved, such that the relief workers can get in and people can return to their homes, one of the major reasons this crisis began will not have been resolved.
But that's going to be something that unfolds over a number of days.
QUESTION: Isn't there a contradiction between encouraging people to go in, let's say, at their own judgment, and trying to resume their relief work, and the threat that NATO holds over the Serbs? Because clearly, from previous experience you know that any people there who are foreigners are liable to be taken as hostage should force be used or be needed.
MR. RUBIN: Well, there are two goals here. One is to have the threat of force and the reality of force very "front and center" for Milosevic to make the decision to comply. The other is to get food and medicine and shelter to people who are hungry. What we are trying to do is to meet those two objectives in as well-coordinated a fashion as we can. But there is always the problem that you mention, and that's inherent the situation, for which there is no one solution.
QUESTION: You said forces--this is just a clarifying--four or five going back to give it some relevance, four or five of how many that have been--
MR. RUBIN: I think there was a total of 100-plus embassy employees who were in Belgrade at the time we began the authorized departure. Some of the dependents--in the dozens or so range--have left. I would say we were down to 15 to 20 or so embassy personnel in the last few days. So those are the rough numbers we're dealing with here.
QUESTION: Are you, in a sense, agreeing that by allowing these people to be back in and by not discouraging them for the next four days, that in a sense you undercut the threat of the use of force?
MR. RUBIN: No.
QUESTION: Well I don't see how you maintain the threat if you have potential hostages on the ground.
MR. RUBIN: There is always that situation inherent in Serbia--it's inherent today, it was inherent yesterday. So it's a problem to be managed; it's not a "black and white" situation as you're making it out to be.
QUESTION: Is there an agreement or is there a written agreement or something that's come out of Holbrooke's talks?
MR. RUBIN: They're working on that. I don't know where the status of the paperwork is, but Milosevic will commit on paper to comply in full with Resolution 1199. That is the essential point. We are working on paperwork to enable the OSCE to--Secretary Albright spoke this morning to Foreign Minister Geremek, who will be going to Belgrade shortly to finalize the arrangements for the verification teams to go in. That will also involve a certain amount of paperwork.
QUESTION: How about Milosevic's commitment--his unilateral statement about going back to negotiations and--
MR. RUBIN: That would be his unilateral statement, so we wouldn't necessarily be issuing such paper. But it's my understanding that what we're talking about here is a situation in which President Milosevic would be making clear that he is going to move smartly to a timetable in a short number of days and weeks, perhaps, or early next month, for reaching an interim arrangement with the Kosovar Albanians. He has agreed, and we believe will make that clear, that the Kosovar Albanians will have self-government and the creation of Kosovar institutions of government as well as the establishment of Kosovar local police.
So those three points--a firm timetable for interim arrangement; number two, institutions of self-government for the Kosovar Albanians; and three, police--these are the very things that he refused to do all along that have caused the justifiable concern on the part of the Kosovar Albanians that they are not getting the legitimate rights that they deserve. So these are the things he has now agreed to do, which, if implemented, will change the political situation dramatically.
QUESTION: The police situation?
MR. RUBIN: Can we do this one at a time--
QUESTION: No, you just said something about the police.
MR. RUBIN: I can't answer if all three of you are talking.
QUESTION: What is the firm timetable in this case?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to be more specific than to say early next month.
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: Follow up on the follow-up of the follow-up?
QUESTION: (Inaudible.)
MR. RUBIN: One at a time; I can't hear you if you all talk at the same time.
QUESTION: You say he is restoring self-government. Is he basically, then, lifting all of the regime that has been imposed since 1989, and restoring autonomy unilaterally or is he negotiating a restoration of what was a constitutional autonomy?
MR. RUBIN: These are statements that he would make confirming the three points that I described to you, that would be part and parcel of the interim arrangement we're hoping to achieve in a short number of weeks.
QUESTION: I understand that you said that you're working on paperwork on the agreement.
MR. RUBIN: It may be done already; I'm not in a position to share that with you.
QUESTION: All right. Whether it's done or when it's done, my question is, will Milosevic sign the piece of paper himself?
MR. RUBIN: I'll have to check with the negotiators, but I believe the answer to that question is yes.
QUESTION: Can you explain the police thing again? I thought the negotiation--well, Holbrooke wouldn't call it negotiation--the conversation with Milosevic--
MR. RUBIN: No, he was prepared to call it that.
QUESTION: No, he doesn't like the word "negotiation" with a dictator; he thinks that conversation--
MR. RUBIN: I think I'd say that's a semantic distinction.
QUESTION: Okay, well, whatever it was that went on with him--I thought one of the issues was a percentage arrangement.
MR. RUBIN: For police?
QUESTION: Police--local and Serbian; no?
MR. RUBIN: Well, certainly if one is going to get to an interim arrangement that satisfies the interest of the 90% or so Kosovar Albanians and the 10% or so Serbs in Kosovo, there will have to be some arrangements that give confidence to both groups.
What I'm saying to you is that President Milosevic will make clear publicly that there can be established a Kosovar local police force. For those of you who have been to the region and know what the Kosovar Albanians have been looking for, I would think you would agree that's a substantial step forward.
QUESTION: I mean, I'm not challenging, but we're not talking about an all-Kosovar police force.
MR. RUBIN: The exact nature, as I said when I answered, which is 90% Kosovar Albanian, 10% Serb in Kosovo, I wouldn't think that the Serbs would be satisfied with an all-Kosovar Albanian arrangement for their security. But the fact is he's going to allow the creation of a Kosovar Albanian police force, which is substantial movement towards self-government and greater autonomy and the kind of rights and confidence that the people there have been looking for so many years.
QUESTION: And you have a timetable for negotiations.
MR. RUBIN: Right.
QUESTION: Do you have a timetable for withdrawal? If it's been worked out yet-- this is a complicated situation--who or what body or person or country is the judge of compliance when these three-and-a-half days are over?
MR. RUBIN: Well, let me take you through the technical side and then the political side. On the technical side, there are various bodies now that have their views as to what is going on the ground. They include people's national monitoring capabilities; they include some of those who are remaining on the ground; they include statements by the Serb side, which we tend to take with more than a grain of salt.
So what we're expecting to see happen is tomorrow and the next day and the day after that, increasing numbers of verifiers will begin to arrive in Kosovo and begin to check to see whether the right number of troops are in the barracks; the right number of troops are heading out of Kosovo; whether there is freedom of movement on the roads; whether refugees are feeling more comfortable about returning home; whether the police are continuing to maraud and demonstrate hostile intent to the people there, or whether they are tending to be silent so that people can come back to their homes.
The technical side of your question is going to get better with each passing day, as the verifiers get into answer the questions embodied in Resolution 1199.
On the political side, it is my understanding that in the course of the next few days, culminating in Friday night, and based on these technical pieces of information I've described to you, NATO authorities will meet and discuss whether they think there's been substantial enough compliance in order to extend further the order to General Wes Clark to be able to launch the air strikes.
So this will be a rolling process, fed by the best possible factual information we can get, to make sure that we achieve two things: number one, that as much of the compliance can be achieved in as short amount of time as possible; and two, that the threat of force continues to hang over President Milosevic's head until we have full compliance. That is what NATO authorities, in conjunction with the verifiers, in conjunction with the United States and other countries, is going to continue to work on in the coming days.
But this is a work in progress; this is a situation that has never occurred before, where you have NATO threatening to use force in a situation like this. In the other cases, as you remember--the only other case--there were--UNPROFOR was on the ground. So what we're trying to do is to meet the test that Roy mentioned, which is to make sure that people on the ground don't become hostages, but at the same time, have the information that we need so that we can make a judgment and make sure that we're in a position to feed the hungry and provide shelter to those who need it.
All of that has to be coordinated and put in sync so that we can achieve our objectives. That's what people are working on assiduously right now in the Department and in the field.
QUESTION: All last week we heard repeated statements that he can't be trusted. What is it that--asking for a bit of judgment on the Administration's part--is it the new areas--verification--what is it that caused Holbrooke, et al, the Secretary, to conclude that you can trust him for four more days maybe?
MR. RUBIN: That's not what we're saying, Barry. I tried very hard to be as clear as I can, but--
QUESTION: You wanted to give him a little time--
MR. RUBIN: No. We are willing to make the judgment Friday night, Saturday morning, whether there's been sufficient movement across the board in the key areas, so that we believe there is a strategic change in his decision-making: from playing "hide-the-troops" and "put-the-troops-in-a-different-location-but-have-them-still-available," to a strategic change: to stop the repression, to allow people to go their homes and to allow the monitors and verifiers to do their work.
These are things that we will know when we see them; and the only way to see them is to let the next few days unfold. If they don't happen, then the facts will speak for themselves and NATO authorities will be in a position to act.
QUESTION: A technical question--can NATO now strike without any other checks or conversations or consultations? Is Wesley Clark now the only person who can decide whether to launch strikes?
MR. RUBIN: After 96 hours, the authority will be provided to him. That's the decision they made last night.
QUESTION: So at this point, he does not have the authority to launch air strikes?
MR. RUBIN: The NATO decision was, essentially, to put on hold the conduct of air strikes for 96 hours; after which, Wes Clark will be in a position to act. So any time between now and those 96 hours, NATO will meet and decide whether they think that the situation has changed substantially and seriously, and that Milosevic has now made a strategic decision to change course--to change from repressing the Kosovar Albanians to providing the conditions in which the people can return to their homes without fear of being slaughtered by police and army units.
That's a strategic change that we will be able to know, whether he's moved in that direction by Friday night. If he has not, the authority will transfer to Wes Clark to act pursuant to any operational considerations he has.
That's as clear as I can be. If NATO decides that there has been substantial and serious compliance in the coming three-and-a-half days, then it will act to either extend the time frame or to create some other mechanism, so that the threat of force that is credible today continues to be credible throughout the implementation of this agreement.
QUESTION: What I'm trying to get at--there's a lot of ambiguity of what an Activation Order actually meant. We never really had a straight answer from anybody anywhere.
MR. RUBIN: Well, as I recall, you were the one who was surprised and developed some theory about why we were talking about it at all. So all I can tell you, Sid, is that this decision--
QUESTION: No, I mean, it's a technical question--
MR. RUBIN: --is the authority - it's a political--
QUESTION: Jamie, it's a technical question--
MR. RUBIN: Let me try to answer your question.
QUESTION: Let me ask the question first, please. It's a technical question. Does an Activation Order put the gun, so to speak, in Wes Clark's hand; or is there another step in between an Activation Order and--
MR. RUBIN: I have answered it five times. Anything more?
QUESTION: Jamie, you haven't answered it.
MR. RUBIN: I've answered it five times.
QUESTION: Under NATO rules, does an Activation Order mean that the commander in the field can order strikes, or does there have to be another political consultation?
MR. RUBIN: I'd be happy to repeat for you, Sid.
QUESTION: I'm not interested in the suspension for 96 hours.
MR. RUBIN: You haven't been listening; I'll try it again. The decision by the North Atlantic Council, as I just said, is one which transfers to Wes Clark, after 96 hours, the authority to conduct military strikes.
QUESTION: That's what an Activation Order does?
MR. RUBIN: That's what this Activation Order does. There is no such thing as a generic Activation Order. Each decision is made based on its own merits and the judgment of the political authorities.
So this decision was made to provide to Wes Clark, after 96 hours, the authority to conduct air strikes. If, prior to 96 hours, the political authorities of NATO make a decision that there has been substantial and serious compliance by President Milosevic
--that he's made a strategic decision to turn it around--then they can change that authorization and adjust it in whatever way they see fit.
What I'm trying to say to you is that we intend, as best we can, to ensure that any change that's made if there is substantial and serious compliance maintains the same threat, the same credibility of that threat to use force in the coming days and weeks when this agreement will hopefully be fully and completely implemented.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)--Holbrooke's whereabouts at the moment?
MR. RUBIN: On a plane, heading back to New York.
QUESTION: Back to the issue of the unilateral statement by Milosevic, did he give a written assurance that there will be a unilateral statement or is that just on verbal assurance?
MR. RUBIN: I really don't know. I think we have high confidence he intends to do that. Whether it was done in writing or orally. We tend to have not so much trouble being sure that he's going to say what he says he's going to say, and much more concern about whether he's going to do what he says he's going to do. So we don't have a lot of concern that if he says he's going to say something in the next day or two days or whenever, that he'll say it. The question is will he do it; and that's what the verification system is designed to ensure.
QUESTION: But that's my next question, Jamie. I'm still not clear--how Milosevic can issue a unilateral statement essentially offering to--
MR. RUBIN: Concessions.
QUESTION: --to change the regime that he has imposed by law in laws of the parliament and decrees. It's a very thick collection; it's like Apartheid. This is not just something that he's decreed off the top of his head. How he can do this in a statement-- I mean, can you just explain for me what is the logic?
MR. RUBIN: I think you're over-lawyering this problem, Roy. What we're talking about is a statement by him that expresses their commitment to negotiate an interim arrangement which includes these things by this date, to include self-governing institutions and Kosovar Albanian police. It's not something that is going to be implemented as a result of a statement; it's a position that the Serbs have previously not taken, that they are saying they will take in the negotiations, that we hope will lead to an interim arrangement in a short number of weeks.
So you're looking for laws to be changed on the day he's making the statement, and I would have two responses to that. Number one, he's been able to pass whatever laws he wants to crack down on the Kosovar Albanians. I have confidence that if he chose to pass laws that would ease up on the Kosovar Albanians that he could pass them provided he wanted to. Number two, the unilateral statement is not designed to implement that immediately. The idea here is you have a verification mission in place to provide confidence and security to the people of Kosovo that they can get the food they need; they will not be subject to police intimidation; that they can come back to their homes; that the military is in garrison; that the police who were not there are out of area --pending a political settlement, which would include the two points that I described to you.
QUESTION: The other question is, are you requiring the Kosovar Albanians to negotiate an interim agreement? And negotiate implies that they have to give and take as well -
MR. RUBIN: Everyone has to give and take, yes. Let's just make that a permanent part of our dialogue here.
QUESTION: So what are you asking them to give, please?
MR. RUBIN: Well, an example of that was to postpone the question of the ultimate final status of Kosovo until after this interim period--that's an example.
QUESTION: (Inaudible)--two or three years?
MR. RUBIN: Roughly, yes.
QUESTION: The point is that the autonomy was lifted unilaterally and probably unconstitutionally by Milosevic and you're asking the Kosovar Albanians to make concessions in order to get back what already constitutionally guaranteed to them. Aren't you putting some pressure on--
MR. RUBIN: Again, I think you're missing the point completely.
QUESTION: I may well be.
MR. RUBIN: What we're hoping to do is to get a political arrangement; and the political arrangement has to have a higher degree of autonomy, a higher degree of self-government, including Kosovar Albanian police forces for the people of Kosovo-- something that was stripped from them, as you've said and we have said ourselves, many years ago. In order to get that and get it implemented successfully, there has to be a political discussion.
We think the threat of force in recent days has changed the dynamic on the part of the Serb side to allow for substantial concessions in this area, including Kosovar Albanian police and stated commitment to self-governing institutions for the Kosovar Albanians-- something that has been sadly missing for 10-plus years.
If you're asking me, can we resolve every problem that President Milosevic has caused in Kosovo with a few meetings by Ambassador Holbrooke, no we cannot. What we can do is provide them the legitimate rights and the political institutions that they deserve. You ask for an example of something that they have to give up. Well, it's well-known that the Kosovar Albanians wish an independent state. Our idea of this negotiation is one in which that question is deferred for a couple of years. In the meantime, the self-governing institutions that I've described to you--including police forces--can be implemented; and then we can see whether the greater rights and the greater comfort level of the people living there will change the dynamic, so that they can come up with a successful resolution of the ultimate status of Kosovo.
QUESTION: This is just a specific on the institutions. One of the most symbolically important institutions in Pristina is the university. Was that mentioned at all--about if that's going to be integrated?
MR. RUBIN: I don't think where we are now is to go through the details of the political arrangements that we're hoping to get by early November. But I expect that would be part of it; this education issue is one of the self-governing institutions that the Kosovar Albanians have rightly been concerned about.
QUESTION: Was anything done about--I don't know why you would, but if you did, I wouldn't want to miss it--about who would speak for the Albanians in negotiations? Is it still the spectrum that you guys have been--
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I don't think it's changed particularly.
QUESTION: He didn't get anything out of that--he didn't get any group eliminated or--
MR. RUBIN: I mean, I think he said very clearly that their lack of cohesion is one of the challenges we face, and that continues to be a challenge. More on this subject? Do you have a question on this subject?
QUESTION: The 2,000 observers--
MR. RUBIN: Correct--verifiers.
QUESTION: Verifiers--can you narrow down in any way how many of them will be Americans; where will they come from; and is the U.S. worried they could become hostages of Milosevic?
MR. RUBIN: We have learned a lot of lessons from Bosnia; and one of the lessons of Bosnia is to try to make sure that the Serb side does not cravenly use human shields the way they did in Bosnia. That will be something that will be foremost in the minds of the authorities as we try to arrange this new, unique, 2,000-person force of verifiers, and something that will have to be built into their daily routines and activities.
I think those of you who recall Bosnia will recall that there were people on the ground in Bosnia when air strikes occurred; so it's not a black or a white situation. It was a situation where at certain times the hostage problem was real, but over time ways were found to ensure that when the threat of air strikes was imminent, that the efforts were made to ensure that as best as possible, people couldn't be held hostage. So yes, I am sure that will be foremost in their minds as they develop their standard operating procedures; and it's certainly foremost in our minds as we go through this situation.
Secondly, with respect to the number of Americans, I don't think that's been firmly decided. There are 40-plus countries that potentially could provide people for this mission, including the Russians. I believe Ambassador Holbrooke said he expected and understood there would be some Russian contribution to this. Once a chief of this verifying mission and verification force is created, then I think you will begin to see how the breakdown of various countries (occurs).
So I wouldn't say that because there's 40 countries there's going to be 50 from each country; but certainly 40 x 50 is 2,000--to give you a flavor of what a median number might be. But I don't think those decisions have been made.
QUESTION: The verifiers would not be armed, as you all had said, and they won't be military people--is that still the--
MR. RUBIN: I think those are the kind of things that are being worked out. I wouldn't rule out some self-protection of some kind.
QUESTION: Do you think some military escorts or something?
MR. RUBIN: I don't want to be more specific because these are the discussions that are ongoing right now. But I'm trying to signal that unarmed may be too much. But that's something that's under discussion, and I don't want to pre-judge that.
QUESTION: Okay. And the disarmament of the KLA, is that something that they--
MR. RUBIN: Excuse me--just to add to the first point, though, I think it's clear there will be a process by which the people there will have a tie-in to NATO forces for the purposes of extraction in extremis. So there will be some combination of as many of the lessons learned as we can from the previous operations.
QUESTION: This will be the rapid reaction force that was thrown around a little bit?
MR. RUBIN: I don't know if we used that word; I think it was some other word, but it could have been that word. That rings a bell from another time, too. So let me leave the military officials to use those words properly.
QUESTION: And then disarmament of the KLA--is that something that they gave in to the--
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that. Cease-fire--we expect them not to provoke military operations by conducting military operations of their own.
QUESTION: But no requirement for disarmament?
MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard anything about that.
QUESTION: Jamie, the question is--
MR. RUBIN: I'm the one who is afraid, so--
QUESTION: The question is about money. Were any discussions that Holbrooke had related to money or has Holbrooke or the US committed or ready to commit money to help Kosovars move back to homes which are, in fact, not like they left them?
MR. RUBIN: I believe the number we've provided is somewhere in the order of $60 million worth of assistance to refugees in various forms. I believe that's by far and away the largest number of any other country. We will continue to work through Julia Taft, our Assistant Secretary for Refugees, to try to provide the resources and the capabilities and others who are trying to get services and goods for those people.
I don't know that Ambassador Holbrooke offered a particular amount of money. That would surprise me, given the nature of the discussions. What we were looking for from the Serbs was the kind of--facilitating the work of the refugee and other international relief organizations that right now fear to do their job. As I indicated, there are blockades on certain kind of goods. We're looking for them to let humanitarian goods in, so that the people can get what they need.
As I understand the humanitarian situation, it's not so much that we don't have sufficient supply to provide them, but it's access to them that has made it hard for them to get what they need.
QUESTION: There's a report out of Israel that quotes Netanyahu as saying that--
MR. RUBIN: Could we just stay on this subject, and I'll give you first when we change subjects? Roy, you're not going to ask me about the Middle East peace process?
QUESTION: No, I was going to stick with Kosovo for a moment. I was just wondering what the quid pro quo is for Milosevic giving these various assurances. I mean, what--
MR. RUBIN: Avoiding air strikes; I think it's pretty serious and simple.
QUESTION: But where is the outer wall of sanctions?
MR. RUBIN: Nothing on the outer wall of sanctions.
QUESTION: Is there no--can you say, then, that there is absolutely no commitment by Holbrooke on lifting the outer wall?
MR. RUBIN: I wasn't there, Roy, and so I don't want to tell you every word that was spoken. But I listened last night or this morning to a taped version of his press conference in Belgrade, in which he made clear that this had nothing to do with the outer wall of sanctions. I quote that back to you as the best answer I can offer for your question.
QUESTION: So what, though, is the--under what conditions will the outer wall of sanctions be lifted?
MR. RUBIN: The same as always. I can get that for the record for you.
QUESTION: But Kosovo was one of the major elements?
MR. RUBIN: Right, and an example would be progress towards an interim arrangement that gave the Kosovar Albanians their legitimate rights that they deserve.
QUESTION: So, then, could this agreement--
MR. RUBIN: There are other elements of that outer wall, as you know, and so I'd like to get you that formal statement of our position on that in a taken question.
QUESTION: The other sort of open question is, is there a no-fly zone--either a de facto or by agreement?
MR. RUBIN: No-fly zone, I think, would not be the right term of art; but there is certainly a capability for an elaborate air verification system that I hope my Pentagon colleagues are briefing your colleagues about, which would be run by NATO, which would provide broad confidence that NATO aircraft--reconnaissance aircraft--could fly unimpeded and unrestricted without being subject to air defense attacks in a broad swath of territory necessary to confirm and verify the arrangements required under this agreement. So there will be a broad swath of territory over Kosovo in which NATO reconnaissance aircraft will be able to fly and verify what's going on--exactly the nature of which, I suspect, is also still being worked on and I would like to leave to my Pentagon colleagues to describe in further detail.
QUESTION: This is general, but there's also the basic political question of who has control over the airspace because if NATO is going to--can NATO fly unrestricted?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, that's the term of art--unrestricted.
QUESTION: So then NATO has control of the airspace?
MR. RUBIN: Over all of Serbia--that's not what I said. It would have--
QUESTION: Over Kosovo.
MR. RUBIN: It will have the unrestricted capability it needs to verify from the air that the Serbs are complying with this arrangement. It's really up to the Pentagon to describe in greater detail exactly what arrangements are being made to make sure that these planes are not subject to air attack, or the radars are handled properly on the ground; that there's enough of a window before and after they try to launch a flight so that there are no mistakes. These are things that we've done in the past in other parts of the world, and the experts are working on it to make sure that we have something we've never had before, which is this combination of an on-the-ground and in-the-air verification system in a situation like this.
QUESTION: Do they have to seek or get flight clearance, as most planes would ordinarily have to do?
MR. RUBIN: Again, the arrangements as I understand them provide the unrestricted - military officials negotiated this to their satisfaction--that they would have the unrestricted access they needed in the air to be able to contribute to overall judgments about compliance.
QUESTION: I know you said earlier someone had worked out, but did you say there would at least be some Americans in this force?
MR. RUBIN: Yes, I do expect there to be Americans in this force. I was trying to just do some simple math for you to give you a possible--40 countries, 2,000 verifiers. But I don't think it's fair to do the math and hold us to that; but we would expect some Americans to participate in a significant way.
QUESTION: I know you don't want to go further, but there's a Russian official quoted saying they would provide 200-250. Do you think the U.S. might match that in some way?
MR. RUBIN: The idea now is to get, in the coming days, this arrangement put in place. In order to do that, we have to create a mission director; create a staff; create a headquarters in Pristina; create liaison office; ground verification groups: broken down into humanitarian relief, border operations, regular police verification group, force and weapons verification group--a whole bunch of missions. The goal is, in the first phase, to establish a headquarters, increase the size of so-called KDOM--the Kosovo monitors that are now in place; then develop specific sponsored-country elements, and bring those to bear with the monitors that are in place; and then ultimately integrate the KDOM into this larger system.
I cannot give you an American number. If the Russians are going to contribute that, and it works out with the arrangements that the head of the OSCE works out, that would be fine with us. But it's really up to him to put this force together, and decide how to make it fit.
I think we will be offering contributions, the exact nature of which I'm not in a position to say; other than to say that we've made a substantial contribution to the monitoring force that's now in pace that will become the verification force.
QUESTION: I was just going to ask who's going to be in charge of this. Last two questions - will there be Americans there, and who will tell the Americans what to do; do you know?
MR. RUBIN: I think there will be arrangements to satisfy members of Congress that nobody who shouldn't will tell Americans what to do.
QUESTION: You all have been pretty clear about what Milosevic is not supposed to do in Kosovo any more. What sort of authority does he still maintain over affairs in Kosovo?
MR. RUBIN: I would have to get someone who's on the ground there who can describe it. With Roy here, I'm hesitating to give any of these legal judgments that'll be second-guessed in about a second.
Clearly, Kosovo is part of Serbia right now, and Kosovar Albanians have been repressed under the current situation, with tens of thousands of military forces and police elements repressing them and killing them. What we're trying to do is turn that around, and then given them greater and greater self-government. So I don't know how one could be in worse shape from a central authority perspective than to be killed and maimed and driven into the hillside by the Serbs.
QUESTION: Can we switch to an easier subject--the MiddleEast?
MR. RUBIN: You know we've gone for 48--how many minutes?
QUESTION: 46 minutes on this.
MR. RUBIN: 46 minutes on Kosovo; it's a good thing I studied up.
QUESTION: A different question--if there is no compliance by Friday, you said the air strikes will start.
MR. RUBIN: The Activation Order authorizes Wes Clark to act after 96 hours.
QUESTION: Whatever. If the situation arises that there is air strikes, the only lesson that was learned from Bosnia in the past is that air strikes by itself did not really achieve change. It was arms shipments from Iran to the Bosnians that held Bosnia--
MR. RUBIN: I knew we'd get to the Middle East if I waited long enough. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: I wonder whether there has been any talk about whether the Iranians are arming the Albanians, whether there is any Iranian assistance to them and whether this is a factor in the equation, in the event that there is air strikes.
MR. RUBIN: I think although analogies help us understand the general terms of a situation, I think it would be wrong to make a military analogy to the forces on the ground in Bosnia vis-à-vis the Serb forces on the ground in Bosnia, and the current situation where the Albanian guerrillas--their insurgency has been set back considerably--with the current threat of air strikes. I don't think your assessment is fully accurate with respect to Bosnia. I don't want to re-litigate that in front of all of us; I'll be happy to do that with you afterwards.
But the bottom line is, if Milosevic does not comply substantially and seriously with the requirements by Friday night, NATO military authorities will be authorized to conduct extensive air strikes to compel his compliance. It is that reality that he faces that we believe has caused him to change his tune across the board with respect to Kosovo.